The defendant, Fuzhou某Pin E-commerce Co., Ltd.

The People’s Court of Tongzhou District, Beijing, holds that the defendant entity, a certain brand‑name company, and the defendants Luo Moulin, Yao Mouyuan, Li Mou, and Wang Mou, with the intent to profit, reproduced and distributed others’ works of fine art without the copyright holders’ permission, and that their conduct involved other serious circumstances. Accordingly, the actions of both the defendant entity and the four defendants constitute the crime of infringement of copyright and shall be punished in accordance with the law. The defendant company, Luo Moulin, and Yao Mouyuan played a principal role in the joint crime and are thus principal offenders; accordingly, they shall be punished in accordance with the entirety of the offenses in which the corporate defendant and the two individual defendants participated. Li Mou and Wang Mou played a secondary role in the joint crime and, pursuant to law, shall be given lighter punishment. The defendant company, Certain Products Co., Ltd., and Luo Moulin voluntarily surrendered themselves and, upon doing so, truthfully confessed to the facts of the crime, constituting self‑surrender; therefore, they may be given lighter punishment in accordance with the law. Yao Mouyuan, after surrendering, truthfully confessed to the facts of the crime and assisted in the apprehension of co‑offenders, thereby rendering meritorious service; accordingly, he may be given lighter punishment in accordance with the law. Li Mou and Wang Mou, upon surrendering, also truthfully confessed to the facts of the crime and, as such, may be given lighter punishment in accordance with the law. The defendant company and all four defendants voluntarily pleaded guilty and accepted the prescribed penalties; accordingly, they may be treated more leniently in accordance with the law. Furthermore, considering that none of the four defendants has any prior criminal record, that they have proactively returned their illegal gains, and that defendant Luo Moulin has actively compensated the victims for their economic losses, these circumstances have been comprehensively taken into account in determining the sentence. In light of the specific circumstances of this case, the court has, in accordance with the law, decided to impose suspended sentences on defendants Li Mou and Wang Mou. In summary, based on the facts, nature, circumstances, and degree of harm to society posed by the crimes committed by the defendant company, Certain Products Co., Ltd., and by defendants Luo Moulin, Yao Mouyuan, Li Mou, and Wang Mou, in accordance with… Criminal Law In accordance with Articles 217, 220, 30, 31, Paragraph 1 of Article 25, Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 26, Article 27, Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 67, Articles 68, 61, 45, 47, 52, 53, Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 72, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 73, and Article 64; Article 15 of the Criminal Procedure Law; and Articles 12, 13, and 25 of the Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights (Fa Shi [2025] No. 5, hereinafter referred to as the “Interpretation”), the court renders the following judgment on June 13, 2025:

(1) With respect to images generated by generative AI technologies using the “image-to-image” process, how can one determine whether such images constitute a reproduction of the original work or qualify as a new work distinct from the original?

As a work, it should comply with Article 3 of the Copyright Law The requisite originality must encompass independent creative activity by a human. Article 15 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Disputes over Copyright, which came into effect on January 1, 2021, likewise stipulates that a work must exhibit both independence and creativity. Given the fundamental difference between AI‑generated images and traditionally created works of art in terms of their respective authors, a differentiated analytical framework should be applied when assessing whether each type of work possesses originality. In the case of traditional works of art, the author is clearly identifiable: a human creator independently undertakes the entire process, from conception to expression, and the work’s originality is directly reflected in its final visual manifestation. Accordingly, the examination of originality for such works should focus on the distinctiveness of their expressive outcome. By contrast, generative artificial intelligence—specifically, image‑to‑image generation—is a technique that, based on the semantic features of an input image, employs parameterized models to reconstruct visual representations and produce a new image. At its core, this approach uses algorithms to establish associations and generate derivative images from existing ones. Consequently, the output of AI‑generated images arises from the combined interplay of “human instructions plus algorithmic execution,” endowing the creative agent with a composite nature. Because the “works” produced through the mechanical operations of AI software exhibit considerable randomness and fail to embody the kind of originality that stems from conscious human control and reflects the creator’s individual, distinctive expression, the assessment of originality in AI‑generated images should, in addition to evaluating the resulting visual product, also scrutinize the creative process itself—namely, the extent of human intervention in shaping the generated output. In other words, To determine whether an AI-generated image possesses the originality required of a work, it must be assessed in terms of both “creative control” and “non‑substantial similarity.”

So‑called creative control refers to the human capacity to exert substantial influence over algorithmically generated outcomes through actions such as instruction design, parameter tuning, and result optimization, followed by subsequent interventions—such as manual selection and refinement—that ensure the final output reflects the creator’s personalized aesthetic judgment or artistic choices, rather than being the product of the algorithm’s random computations. In short, In other words, humans retain ultimate control over the final outcome. In practice, when determining whether the defendant exercised creative control over the generated result, the court may require the defendant to submit their original conceptual designs, the complete raw data underlying the use of artificial intelligence in the creative process, as well as relevant materials and images documenting how the AI-generated output progressively realized the defendant’s intended artistic vision, for evaluation. The so‑called “non‑substantive similarity” refers to situations where the generated image fails to preserve the original work’s originality‑bearing expressive elements that are protected by copyright. For ordinary works, originality is manifested in the organic integration of core visual elements, such as compositional framework, distinctive lines, and color relationships. When a generated image merely alters marginal embellishments—such as background textures or corner details—without affecting these non‑core elements and without giving rise to any new aesthetic significance, it does not preclude a finding of substantive similarity. In practice, It is difficult to establish an objective standard for determining whether two works are substantially identical; most assessments involve a holistic comparison between the allegedly infringing work and the original work, using the average person’s visual or aesthetic perception as the benchmark. If the visual impression conveyed is the same, the works are deemed substantially identical. This holistic approach encompasses both a comprehensive comparison of the work as a whole and a comparative analysis of the original work’s original, distinctive elements.

In this case, under the direction of the defendant Yao Mouyuan, the AI artist used Stable Diffusion software as instructed, imported others’ artistic works, and selected the “image-to-image” function. After uniformly setting the parameters to generate multiple images, the artist chose the one most similar to the original, adjusted its resolution, and directly produced it as a collage for sale. Throughout this process, the AI artist merely performed simple parameter adjustments and image selection; they did not engage in activities—such as adding descriptive prompts, modifying the random seed, adjusting the number of iterations, or applying post‑production manual retouching—that could exert decisive influence over the generated output. Nor did they select and refine images according to their own creative intentions to meet personalized aesthetic preferences. Instead, they simply picked the most similar image from among those generated via the “image-to-image” technique as the template for creating the collage. This choice further demonstrates that their underlying aim was a mechanical reproduction of the original work, with a subjective intent focused on replication rather than creation. Accordingly, the defendants’ use of the “image-to-image” technology to generate images does not satisfy the standard of creative control and does not constitute an act of authorship exercised under the guidance of personal consciousness. A comparison between the original works and the images at issue reveals that the AI‑generated images used to produce the collages exhibit only a minimal degree of discrepancy in such elements as contour, composition, line work, and the distribution of visual elements—insufficient to give rise to any new aesthetic significance. Consequently, these generated images also fail to meet the criterion of non‑substantial similarity. In sum, in this case… The images generated and selected by the defendant using “image‑to‑image” technology neither reflect the defendant’s deliberate, conscious control over the resulting visual effects nor avoid substantial similarity to the original work’s distinctive features; accordingly, they do not qualify as new works created from the original as source material, but rather constitute infringing reproductions that are substantially identical to the original.

It should be noted that, in practice, the criteria of inventive step and non‑substantial identity are mutually complementary and follow a progressive relationship— If the actor has not exercised creative control, the resulting work does not constitute a new work, regardless of whether it is identical to the original. If the actor exercises dominant control over the generated result, it must then be further assessed whether the generated result exhibits a significant difference in expression from the original work. At the same time, the law protects the original expression of a work, not the medium or material on which it is embodied; accordingly, changes to such non‑essential factors as the technique, medium, size, or material do not affect the determination of whether a work possesses originality. In this case, the defendant took an infringing copy as the prototype and further transformed the artistic work into a jigsaw puzzle, thereby preserving the original work’s core visual elements while merely altering its medium and form. Such conduct, in essence, still constitutes a reproduction of another person’s artistic work.

(II) Analysis of the Circumstances Pertinent to Conviction and Sentencing in This Case

As a quintessential crime that combines elements of both monetary value and aggravating circumstances, the determination of the facts relevant to conviction and sentencing in copyright infringement cases must adhere to the judicial principle of “prioritizing monetary value, with circumstances serving as supplementary factors.” This feature is reflected both in the statutory structure of Article 217 of the Criminal Law and in the Interpretation that has been in effect since April 26, 2025: in principle, conviction and sentencing are determined based on the amount of illegal gains; however, when such gains cannot be ascertained due to objective reasons, other objective factors—such as the amount of illegal business operations or the quantity of copies reproduced and distributed—are used as the basis for determination.

First, this case cannot be adjudicated and sentenced based on the amount of illegal gains. According to Article 28 of the Interpretation, the amount of illegal gains refers to all unlawful proceeds obtained or receivable by the offender after selling products infringing intellectual property rights, less the costs of raw materials and the purchase price of the sold products. Thus, the amount of illegal gains represents the direct proceeds of the criminal act. In this case, the defendant employed a decentralized online sales model, utilized multiple payment channels, and failed to maintain complete financial records, making it difficult to accurately calculate actual costs and profits. Consequently, sentencing cannot be determined on the basis of the amount of illegal gains.

Secondly, this case should be convicted and sentenced on the basis of “other serious circumstances.” According to Article 13, Paragraph 1 of the Interpretation, even if the amount of illegal gains cannot be ascertained, so long as circumstances such as an illegal business turnover exceeding RMB 50,000 or a total of more than 500 copies are present, it may be deemed to constitute “other serious circumstances.” In this case, the defendant unit and the defendants engaged in illegal business activities totaling RMB 270,000, and the number of puzzle reproductions and distributions reached 3,000 units. Both the relevant monetary threshold and the quantity threshold satisfy the criteria for “other serious circumstances” set forth in the Interpretation; therefore, these should serve as the primary basis for conviction and sentencing. Meanwhile, Article 13, Paragraph 3 of the Interpretation stipulates that the determination of “other particularly serious circumstances” requires that the relevant monetary or quantitative thresholds exceed ten times the standards specified in the preceding two paragraphs; accordingly, this case does not meet the threshold for “other particularly serious circumstances.”

In summary, the use of artificial intelligence to mass‑produce infringing works is characterized by efficiency, concealment, and large scale, and may pose a greater threat to market order than traditional manual copying. In judicial practice, such conduct should be rigorously evaluated in accordance with the principle of legality and the provisions of the Criminal Law. Principle of Restraint Conduct a substantive analysis to integrate new forms of infringement enabled by technology into the legal interpretive framework of traditional norms, thereby ensuring the accuracy and legitimacy of conviction and sentencing.

　(Author: Xu Li, Tongzhou District People’s Court, Beijing; Li Xinye, Tongzhou District People’s Court, Beijing; Editor: Duan Huang, Second Criminal Division, Supreme People’s Court)